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2 An ontological framework for English 
 
Christopher J Hall, York St John University 
 
1 Introduction 
 
What is there in the world that we refer to as ‘the English language’? Is it more than one 
thing? If so, how many? And what is their ontological status? For those of us engaged in 
researching and teaching what we call English, these are fundamental questions, yet they 
are seldom posed. In addressing them explicitly here, I aim to provide academics, teachers, 
and policymakers with some conceptual tools and arguments for a deeper reflection on the 
nature of English, with a view to ultimately benefiting learners and users. 
 
In this chapter I propose that ‘English’ corresponds to a series of ontological categories and 
types, pertaining to different but related (sometimes coordinated) entities, which are 
significant for language learning, teaching, and assessment in different ways and to different 
degrees. I don’t claim that the framework is exhaustive or the only one possible; instead, I 
adopt the nonessentialist position that conceptualizations of things are useful only in certain 
contexts and for certain purposes (Janicki, 2006). Furthermore, my approach is that of an 
applied linguist, not a philosopher of language, and accordingly I draw only sporadically and 
superficially on the extensive philosophical body of work on the topic (cf. Santana, 2016, for 
a recent example). I am interested in how English is conceived by linguists, language 
educators, and laypeople, not by metaphysicians. So although I appropriate ideas and 
terminology from this scholarship, I have in mind the ‘ordinary understandings’ of English 
which underpin the research agendas, educational practices, and public discourses 
associated with English learning, teaching, assessment, and use. Although my proposals are 
theory-engaged, they are not here theory-committed. Several of the conceptualizations of 
English I address derive from or are consistent with (often competing) orientations in 20th 
and 21st century linguistics and applied linguistics, but it is not my intention to advocate one 
over another, even though I am sometimes critical in my assessment of their claims. 
 
My point of departure is the polysemy of the word English. The noun refers to both the 
people of England (‘the English’) and a language which was originally used only by these 
people, but is now used by many more (‘English’ and ‘Englishes’). It is a nominalization of 
the adjective English, derived from England, ‘the land of the Angles’. Taking this polysemy as 
the key premise, I will be claiming that English, when used in relation to language, labels 
types of entities associated with two ontological categories, both of which are social 
institutions (Searle, 1995). One set of types sits within the ontological category of the 
‘LANGUAGE CAPACITY’, the species property for linguistic representation and communication. 
Within this ontological category (henceforth indicated in SMALL CAPITALS), English is a set of 
instantiations of the broader capacity. Understood thus, English is something we need not 
be aware of: it is a set of cognitive and social resources, processes, and products which 
would exist even if we had no name for it, and which in practice mixes freely in multilingual 
users with other linguistic (and non-linguistic) resources, processes, and products in the 
construction and communication of meaning. 
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The second set of ontological types is socially constructed on the basis of the contemplation 
of the first set and corresponds to the conceptualizations underpinning value-laden 
ideologies of English (cf. Sharpe, 1974; Canagarajah, this volume, Section 4). I contend that 
the construals of English in this set are all directly or indirectly derived from the process of 
collective identification (Jenkins, 2004) holding at the level of NATION. Very recently in the 
evolution of the species, consciousness of particular instantiations of the LANGUAGE CAPACITY 
(languages in the plural) contributed to the social construction of nations, and this 
consciousness was in turn recruited as a constitutive element of them, to the extent that 
several specific instantiations of the LANGUAGE CAPACITY so recruited came to share the name 
of the nations they were associated with. In this sense, ‘English’ (the language) is something 
instantiating Englishness, a monolithic property of the NATION England, rather than a 
‘plurilithic’ manifestation of the LANGUAGE CAPACITY. This conceptualization was accompanied 
by the social construction of a fixed code, ‘Standard English’, leading to dichotomies of 
correctness and accuracy.  
 
In line with ideas propounded by Integrational Linguists (e.g. Harris, 1981) and critical 
applied linguists (e.g. Makoni and Pennycook, 2007), I will suggest that understandings of 
English provided within linguistics and purveyed in schools are derived from, conditioned by, 
or defined with reference to, this second ontological category, rather than directly from the 
first. Such understandings are now, more than ever, open to critique. The times and spaces 
we live in are radically different from those of the period of several centuries over which 
English as a national fixed code emerged (cf. Wright, 2015). The unique identification of the 
English language with the English nation has long since disappeared, and English is a global 
phenomenon. But the association lives on in our ontological commitments. For the benefit 
of L1 and L2 learners and users, these commitments need to be explicitly recognised and 
critically assessed. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I develop the ontological taxonomy I have 
previously used to tease apart the concepts expressed by the word language, in applied 
linguistics (Hall, 2013), in TESOL (Hall et al., 2017b), and in non-native usage (Hall et al., 
2017a; Hall, 2018). The following two sections map the entity types identified in the 
taxonomy onto English as constituted by the two sets of resources, processes, and products 
identified above. Thus, Section 3 deals with English as instantiations of the LANGUAGE 
CAPACITY, and Section 4 with these instantiations contemplated as direct or indirect 
manifestations of collective identification with the English NATION. In Section 5, I use the 
entities mapped in the framework to critically assess how English is treated as a subject in 
educational contexts. Section 6 provides a brief conclusion. 
 
2 An ontological taxonomy for language 
 
The taxonomy for language that I have been developing, only briefly sketched in the 
publications cited above, comprises eight ontological types. In Hall et al. (2017b), these 
eight types were grouped into four domains: cognitive, notional, expressive, and social (see 
Figure 2.1). These domains should not be taken as constructs of a rigorous ontological 
theory, but rather as suggestive markers of where language can be construed as existing, in 
ways which together permeate the human condition. The four domains are intended to 
mark out aspects of human experience in the following ways. The cognitive domain captures 
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entities and processes which are understood to exist by virtue of their development and 
operation in the human mind (e.g. visual processing and episodic memory). The expressive 
domain embraces those physically manifested products of intentional mental processes 
which may be understood as signifying or indexing meanings in more or less highly 
structured ways (e.g. gestures and nonverbal interjections). The notional domain contains 
entities which exist as theoretical constructs, models, taxonomies and the like, often 
elaborated in formal systems, consciously devised to describe and/or explain entities in 
other ontological domains (e.g. calculus and Linnaean taxonomy). Finally, the social domain 
includes all those entities, properties, relations, and processes which are understood to exist 
at the level of groups of individuals and the relations between them (e.g. trade and choral 
singing). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: An ontological framework for language (Hall, 2013; Hall et al., 2017) 
 
In this chapter, I introduce a further parameter of ontological categorization, which 
distinguishes between English as resource, process, and product. First, though, I describe 
each conceptualization of language in turn. 
 
2.1 The cognitive domain 
 
In the cognitive domain, the general species capacity (the ‘LANGUAGE CAPACITY’) is 
distinguished from its instantiation in individual minds (‘I-LANGUAGE’). This distinction is a 
useful starting point for understanding how English language is conceptualized, since it 
captures two poles of a continuum on which English is commonly understood to be situated: 
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somewhere between language as a general phenomenon and as individual linguistic 
resources.  
 
2.1.1 The LANGUAGE CAPACITY 
 
One way of conceptualizing language is as the species property for linguistic representation 
and communication which develops naturally in humans but not in other animals, even if 
exposed to similar environments and experiences. I call this entity ‘the LANGUAGE CAPACITY’. 
Whether the capacity is innate and specifically linguistic (Chomsky, 1986) or emerges from 
more general predispositions (Tomasello, 2003), it is clearly heritable and is physically 
located in the mind/brain, rather than the vocal tract or hands, for example. Because it 
holds at the level of the species, it is universal, so corresponds to the non-count noun 
language.  
 
2.1.2 I-LANGUAGE 
 
According to another common understanding, language is the actual grammar, lexis, 
phonology, etc., that we each carry around in our heads. Despite disagreement about 
innateness, linguists agree that the capacity is realised in individual cognitive resources, 
ultimately represented in neural circuits, which develop through experience. Without 
sharing his specific ontological commitments, I have adopted Chomsky’s (1986, pp. 21-46) 
term ‘I-LANGUAGE’ (internalized language) to refer to these instantiations of the LANGUAGE 
CAPACITY. This conceptualization matches the notion of ‘idiolect’, and for some linguists it is 
the only way to understand how language exists. Hall Jr. (1985, p. 353), for example, 
asserted that “all phenomena of language exist only in the ‘know-how’ […] of individual 
speakers, i.e., in their idiolects. […] Each idiolect exists only in the brain of the speaker who 
uses it”. English as a property of individual minds is addressed in 3.1.  
 
2.2 The expressive domain 
 
Beyond biology and cognition, language can be understood as utterances and texts, in what 
I call the expressive domain. Here we can distinguish between: (a) linguistic expression, i.e. 
meaningful words, often in grammatically organized sequences, for which I again adopt a 
term introduced by Chomsky (1986, pp. 19-21): ‘E-LANGUAGE’ (externalized language); and (b) 
physical expression in one of three mediums: acoustically in SPEECH, or visually in SIGN and 
WRITING. 
 
2.2.1 E-LANGUAGE 
 
I-LANGUAGE is concerned with the potential in the brain for assembling utterances and texts. 
But we can also conceptualize language as the linguistic actualizations of this cognitive 
potential, as products of the social processes people engage in: the phonological and lexico-
grammatical structures activated and articulated in language production. Hence, language 
can be conceived in terms of linguistic expressions, the products of I-LANGUAGES, in use as 
tokens (specific instances) or in usage as types (across a genre, for example). These 
products, for which I use the term E-LANGUAGE, may be potential or real, and if the latter, 
recorded (in the form of transcriptions, documents, corpora, etc.) or unrecorded. 
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2.2.2 Medium 
 
Language as the physical tokens of E-LANGUAGE (i.e. as acoustic or visual signals) is a matter 
of the medium that linguistic expressions take (as SPEECH, SIGN, or WRITING). So when 
someone’s language is described as slow or high-pitched, what is being referred to is the 
physical expression, independent of its linguistic properties. SPEECH, SIGN or WRITING have no 
intrinsic meaning; they are physical entities that enable meaning only when processed as E-
LANGUAGE using I-LANGUAGE resources. 
 
2.3 The notional domain 
 
For theorists concerned with describing the structural patterns they observe in samples of E-
LANGUAGE which are derived from similar I-LANGUAGES, languages can be conceived as abstract 
systems of meaning-bearing units and the regularities according to which they are combined 
and interpreted. As such, they exist as theoretical constructs in what I call the notional 
domain, independent of actual instantiations in minds and events. This scholarly 
understanding of language has dominated education since classical times, and is the one 
with which mainstream linguistics has, in practice, been most concerned. A distinction can 
be made between language as an abstraction from I-LANGUAGE, and language as an 
abstraction from E-LANGUAGE. I call the former ‘IDEALIZED I-LANGUAGE’ and adopt Chomsky’s 
term ‘P-LANGUAGE’ (1986, p. 33) for the latter. 
  
2.3.1 IDEALIZED I-LANGUAGE 
 
Although Chomsky (1986) stresses the cognitive nature of language as an individual mental 
property, actual accounts of I-LANGUAGE within generative linguistics are based on intuitions 
of ‘grammaticality’ which are assumed to hold across speakers. A working assumption is 
that there are separate language systems (grammars) which distinguish groups of I-
LANGUAGEs (and therefore groups of people). Chomsky, (1986, p. 27), for example, refers to 
“a system of rules, English, an I-language”. A similar assumption holds in other cognitively-
oriented theoretical frameworks such as usage-based linguistics (cf. Eskildsen, this volume). 
I use the term IDEALIZED I-LANGUAGE to refer to any abstraction from a set of similar I-
LANGUAGEs to a language system assumed to be shared by a specific group of speakers. 
 
2.3.2 P-LANGUAGE 
 
In one ordinary conceptualization, languages exist as abstract entities, independent of 
individual minds or behaviours, but inferable from the products of those behaviours. This is 
P-LANGUAGE, where the ‘P’ refers to the Platonic notion of abstract entities like numbers, not 
locatable in space and time. Just as numbers can be related in systems which are 
independent of actual things or events in the world (e.g. 2 + 2 = 4), so language(s) can be 
seen as abstract systems which exist apart from specific mental states of individuals (I-
LANGUAGE) and the products of their behaviours (E-LANGUAGE). This ontological status is 
apparent in Saussure’s assertion that “[a] language [langue] is not complete in any speaker; 
it exists perfectly only within a collectivity” (1916, pp. 13-14). I argue in 4.2 that most 
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linguistic descriptions of ‘the English language’ are (inevitably) describing a P-LANGUAGE 
abstraction, rather than I-LANGUAGE or its actualization E-LANGUAGE. 
 
2.4 The social domain 
 
Perhaps most commonly, people conceptualize language as an inherently social 
phenomenon, pertaining to group identity and activity. This is particularly so when ways of 
using language are associated with social groups perceived as unified at the level of nation, 
a conceptualization I call ‘N-LANGUAGE’. More broadly, language exists to serve social 
functions, and so can be conceptualized (but less commonly so) as itself a social process or 
practice, rather than a national attribute or a cognitive/biological phenomenon (cf. 
Pennycook, 2010). I use the term ‘LANGUAGING’ for this sense. These are both ways of 
construing language in the social domain, as a constitutive element of group beliefs and 
behaviours. 
 
2.4.1 N-LANGUAGE 
 
Perhaps the most widely-held ‘folk’ understanding of language is in the sense of named 
languages, monolithic linguistic systems, typically thought of as being used (more or less 
well) by monolingual citizens of a nation from which the language name often derives. This 
is what I have called N-LANGUAGE (Hall, 2013), where the ‘N’ suggests national, named, 
native, and normed. The key role of language in the emergence of modern conceptions of 
the nation has been noted by political scientists (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1992) 
and critically discussed by linguists and applied linguists (e.g. Haugen, 1966; Harris, 1981; 
Joseph, 2004; Makoni and Pennycook, 2007).  
 
N-LANGUAGE is governed by norms at the level of linguistic form (pronunciation, 
spelling/punctuation, lexis, and grammar), such that certain forms are prescribed as correct 
(part of ‘the language’) and others not. The norms are regulative rather than constitutive 
(Searle, 1969, pp. 33-37), with social sanctions attached for non-compliance (e.g. 
stigmatization for unstandardized language use). Haugen (1966, p. 928) argued that this 
relatively recent conceptualization of language was a natural consequence of the national 
ideal which “demands that there be a single linguistic code by means of which 
[communication within the nation] can take place”. This ‘single linguistic code’ is the so-
called ‘Standard Variety’, which comes to be understood as ‘the language’ itself, excluding 
other varieties such as regional or social dialects. With a single code comes the possibility of 
accuracy judgements (correct/incorrect, compliance/non-compliance). The consequences of 
this for the ontology of English is discussed in 4.1 and, for English as a subject in education, 
in section 5. 
 
2.4.2 LANGUAGING 
 
At a more fundamental social level, language can be understood not in terms of abstract 
symbolic systems construed as components of group identity (N-LANGUAGE), but as socially-
embedded processes (actual communication). Language doesn’t just encode referential 
meanings, but actually does things—it has performative and indexical functions, changing 
social reality through speech acts (Searle, 1969), and signalling social solidarity or difference 
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through “acts of identity” (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller, 1985; my emphasis). According to 
Searle (2010, p. 85), “[l]anguage doesn’t just describe; it creates, and partly constitutes, 
what it both describes and creates”. In this sense, then, language is constitutive of social 
events and the practices that underpin them. For this ontological type I have adopted the 
term LANGUAGING, as used, for example, by Lado (1979), Halliday (1985), Joseph (2002), 
Swain (2006), and Jørgensen (2008). Some scholars imply that language only exists as 
LANGUAGING. Johnstone (2002, p. 235), for example, argued that “[t]o think of discourse as 
‘language use’ means imagining that ‘language’ could exist prior to being ‘used’”. I discuss 
the notion of English as an instantiation of LANGUAGING in 3.2. 
 
3 English as instantiations of the language capacity 
 
We are now ready to use the ontological categories and types identified for language in 
general to try to unpick the multiple ways in which English is understood to exist. To ensure 
maximal precision, I will introduce a new set of terms for entities within the general 
taxonomy labelled by the noun English (see Tables 1 and 2 for summaries). In this section, I 
address English as instantiations of the LANGUAGE CAPACITY. In the following section, I describe 
how these have been transformed by the conflation of language and identity into another 
set of senses which co-evolved with the social construction of the English nation.  
 
Although all human beings share language in the sense of the LANGUAGE CAPACITY, it is variably 
rather than universally instantiated, developing different features under different local 
conditions. LANGUAGING works only to the extent that the I-LANGUAGES deployed in the 
process share features. It is only thus that English can be understood to exist independently 
of the national concept: as a set of instantiations of the LANGUAGE CAPACITY. In this sense, its 
relation to a specific territorial area, its association with a specific cultural-political group, its 
name, its integrity as a single system, and the degree to which it can become available to 
consciousness for contemplation, are irrelevant to its ontological status. The types of entity I 
identify in this section exist independently of what people think English is, of the existence 
of the word English, and indeed, of whether people are aware that English exists. The fact 
that two randomly selected language users may not be able to effectively engage in 
LANGUAGING unless they have some common I-LANGUAGE resources, demonstrates that sets of 
I-LANGUAGES, what people do with them (LANGUAGING), and the products they leave (E-
LANGUAGE in their three mediums), can be grouped together into ontological categories of 
their own. These categories will embrace indeterminate sets of resources, processes, and 
products, involving prototypical, rather than essential features. One of these sets is, in this 
sense, English, an instantiation (or more accurately a group of instantiations) of the 
LANGUAGE CAPACITY. I will call this ontological category ‘L-ENGLISH’ and in the following 
subsections I describe the four types of entity which comprise it. 
 
3.1 English as cognitive resource 
 
In one sense, English is a set of resources represented in the minds of individuals, in 
different quantities and degrees of entrenchment, which allows them to use certain 
linguistic features and constructions meaningfully with individuals who have sufficiently 
similar sets of resources. English in this sense includes the set of I-LANGUAGE resources which 
I deployed to write these sentences and a reader to interpret them, and both of us to 
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produce similar ones. I will call these resources ‘I-ENGLISHES’. They are plural because no two 
people will have identical resources (they are idiolects), and also because individuals will 
have multiple I-ENGLISH resources for different purposes and contexts of use. In Hall (2013) I 
called these ‘I-REGISTERS’. Although uncommon as an object of research, aspects of English I-
REGISTERS are inferred in corpus studies by Mollin (2009) and Barlow (2013) for L1 users, and 
Hall et al. (2017a) for an L2 user. Eskildsen (this volume) reports on his own research tracing 
changes in L2 I-ENGLISHES through time. In LANGUAGING, these resources will be drawn on 
alongside others, both linguistic (e.g. in Jørgensen’s [2008] ‘polylingual languaging’) and 
non-linguistic (cf. Canagarajah, this volume). I-ENGLISHES will constantly be refashioned 
through usage in these LANGUAGING events.  
 
3.2 English as social process 
 
In the LANGUAGING sense, English is also a set of social practices, contextualized acts or 
events, through which speakers realise their communicative intentions, bring states of 
affairs into existence, and signal social identities and relationships. I call this ‘ENGLISHING’ 
(Hall, 2014; cf. Pennycook, 2007, p. 111). In L2 learning and multilingual use, this 
understanding of English is especially pertinent. More people are now learning English as L2 
than as L1, and increasingly are languaging with other L2 learners and users, who regularly 
have different L1s. Such lingua franca uses of English show considerable diversity in the 
depth and breadth of the I-ENGLISH resources deployed, in the degree of overlap between 
them (resulting mostly from L1 influence—cf. Nakatsuhara et al., this volume), and in users’ 
ability to deploy them automatically, without conscious effort (their degree of 
entrenchment; cf. Mauranen, 2012; Hall, 2018). So with fewer reliably shared conventions 
governing language resources, communicative strategies for L2 ENGLISHING take on particular 
significance. Empirical studies suggest that miscommunication is rarer than one might 
expect (cf. Seidlhofer, 2011, ch. 5). Some who research and write about English in lingua 
franca mode have argued that the unstable linguistic forms involved imply that this kind of 
English only exists in LANGUAGING. Canagarajah (2007, p. 928), for example, claims that 
“L[ingua] F[ranca] E[nglish] is not a product located in the mind of the speaker; it is a form of 
social action”. As such, he argues, it is inseparable from the deployment of other semiotic 
resources (including other languages). See Schaller-Schwaner and Kirkpatrick (this volume) 
and Baker (this volume) for more on the multilingual and transcultural nature of ENGLISHING 
in lingua franca contexts. 
 
3.3 English as expressive process and product 
 
Another way in which English can be understood to exist as an instantiation of the LANGUAGE 
CAPACITY is as the set of utterances or sentences that have actually been produced in 
ENGLISHING events, as actualizations of I-ENGLISHES. This is English as E-LANGUAGE, covering both 
tokens of use (e.g. Theresa May’s ten uses of the adjective phrase ‘strong and stable’ at 
Prime Minister’s Questions on 26th April 2017) and patterns of usage (‘strong and stable’ as 
a relatively common ADJ-CONJ-ADJ collocation type). When specific utterances and texts 
have been (or might be) produced as part of ENGLISHING, I call these (actual or potential) 
‘ENENGLISHMENTS’. And ENENGLISHMENTS are, of course, physically enacted through expressive 
processes in two mediums (SPEECH and WRITING), which leave acoustic and visible products. 
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Such ‘ENENGLISHINGS’ will include May’s phonetic tokens [strɒŋn̩stebl]̩ and the corresponding 
orthographic tokens in written records. 
 
Table 2.1 summarizes this first set of conceptualizations of English. 
 
 
L-ENGLISH 
(a set of instantiations of the LANGUAGE CAPACITY) 
Resource Process Product 
Cognitive domain Social domain Expressive domain 
I-ENGLISHES 
(instantiations of I-
LANGUAGE): Individual 
phonological, 
orthographic, and 
lexico-grammatical 
resources 
ENGLISHING 
(instantiations of 
LANGUAGING): Social 
acts using I-
ENGLISHES 
ENENGLISHMENTS 
(instantiations of E-
LANGUAGE): Linguistic 
forms produced 
using I-ENGLISHES in 
ENGLISHING 
ENENGLISHINGS 
(instantiations of 
SPEECH, SIGN, or 
WRITING): Physical 
forms produced 
using I-ENGLISHES in 
ENGLISHING 
 
Table 2.1: English as L-ENGLISH, instantiations of the LANGUAGE CAPACITY 
 
4 English as instantiations of Englishness 
 
The types of entity identified in the preceding section capture the ontological status of the 
linguistic resources, processes, and products which have developed in the minds and 
behaviours of a set of people which started with groups living in the British Isles around one 
and a half millennia ago. When these entities, which collectively I am calling L-ENGLISH, 
became subject to contemplation, and the word English was appropriated to name the 
result of this contemplation, then another set of entity types was created. I claim that the 
defining characteristic of this set is, explicitly or implicitly, identity, at the level of NATION. On 
analogy with forms like wizardry and devilry, I propose to call this ontological category 
‘ENGLISHRY’: the (contemplated) practices, products, or perceived characteristics of ‘the 
English’ or, in other words, the components of English identity. It is the linguistic reflexes of 
ENGLISHRY which are the topic of this section. Once more, we can identify subcategories, but 
in a reduced set of types, namely resources in the social and notional domains. 
 
4.1 English as prescribed object: N-ENGLISH 
 
Probably the most widely accepted conceptualization of English (the ‘folk ontology’) is that 
it is the language of England, or that language as adopted/inherited by another nation, or 
learnt as a ‘foreign language’. It has a single, standard form, prescribed through usage 
guides, ‘the dictionary’, grammar books, and—above all—educational systems (this is what 
Badwan, this volume, calls the ‘standard’ ontology). Although English is no longer uniquely 
tied to ‘the English’, the assumption of ‘one language, one nation’ is deeply embedded. It 
tends to be forgotten that English people have always spoken other languages in addition 
to, or instead of, English (e.g. Cornish, French, British Sign Language; cf. Barbour, 2000). And 
of course there have always been citizens and residents of England and other ‘Anglophone’ 
nations whose native languages are conventionally viewed as ‘foreign’. The serious 
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consequences of this conflation of language and nation are lived by many people on a daily 
basis. The ‘English Only’ movement in the USA, for example, has long been recognised as a 
socially divisive and psychologically harmful reflex of this ideological/ontological stance 
(Padilla et al., 1991). See Fortier (2017) for a critique of the language/nation conflation in 
contemporary Britain. 
 
4.1.1 N-ENGLISH as ‘Standard English’ 
 
There is general agreement that a major factor in how English (later British) national identity 
was able to be consolidated was through recognition of a unified linguistic code, spread 
through what Anderson (1983) called ‘print capitalism’. The unified code for England (and by 
extension Britain and the UK) was ‘Standard English’, with other national varieties 
subsequently also being socially constructed into existence. Its formulation required 
codification and then prescription, as the endpoint of a process through which value is 
transferred from high status user groups to an autonomous linguistic system derived from 
their usage (cf. Le Page and Tabouret-Keller, 1985). Crowley (1991) chronicled how the 
endpoint was reached for English. The texts he cites, from the 18th to the 20th century, 
demonstrate how English became conceived as a single monolithic system, used correctly or 
incorrectly, and how the educational system became the principal mechanism for 
developing and perpetuating this conceptualization. Noting the polysemy of the word 
English, he identifies the issue of “what is to count as ‘proper English’ in the realm of 
language” with “more significant social questions, such as, ‘who are the proper English’?” (p.  
2). The texts show how the use of ‘proper English’ has come to serve as a proxy for its users’ 
good morals and good citizenship, as exemplified by socioeconomic elites. For most users, 
English in this sense is something they may aspire to, but do not fully possess. This is 
particularly the case for non-native learners and users. One telling reference in Crowley’s 
collection, which resonates especially in the current political climate, is to Henry James’ 
assertion that immigrants are particularly guilty of ‘corrupting’ the language (p. 183). English 
in this sense is ‘N-ENGLISH’, a named monolithic system, normed for the correct forms of 
ENENGLISHMENTS rather than the effective enactment of functions through ENGLISHING. 
 
4.1.2 N-ENGLISH in education 
 
In the early stages of its development, consciousness and contemplation of N-ENGLISH were 
confined to privileged elites. It was only with the introduction of generalized public 
education, and with it widespread literacy, that an N-LANGUAGE understanding of English 
became dominant (cf. Hobsbawm, 1992). In public education, it has always been a central 
policy that pupils who have acquired L1 I-ENGLISHES need to be further socialized into 
knowledge and behaviour which reflects N-ENGLISH. Most such children start schooling with 
I-ENGLISHES which would be described in terms of unstandardized P-LANGUAGES, i.e. resources 
which don’t conform to N-ENGLISH norms and would be grouped together as regional or 
social dialects. Currently, educational authorities in England stipulate that teachers must 
“take responsibility for promoting […] the correct use of standard English, whatever the 
teacher’s specialist subject” (Department for Education, 2011, p. 11). Similar mandates exist 
in the USA and other ‘Anglophone’ nations. 
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When teachers sanction (e.g. correct) L1 users because their ENENGLISHMENTS don’t 
correspond to N-ENGLISH norms, the goal is to modify their I-ENGLISH resources. But this 
educational practice is based on a confusion between ontological types. N-ENGLISH is a 
component of identity (ENGLISHRY), a matter of social conformity, rather than effective 
communication (part of L-ENGLISH). By casting English in terms of correctness, rather than 
social conformity, teachers automatically delegitimize (as incorrect) their pupils’ own I-
LANGUAGE resources and LANGUAGING practices (cf. Cunningham, this volume), whether these 
are mono- or multilingual (regrettably, linguists’ use of the term non-standard, as opposed 
to unstandardized, reinforces this for the former; cf. Sharples, this volume, on the latter). If 
conformity with ‘Standard English’ is to be on the curriculum, then, my ontological analysis 
suggests that it should be presented not in terms of accuracy, but as an (arguably desirable, 
perhaps necessary) attribute for socialization into broader (national) identity structures. See 
5.1 for more on this, and Harder, this volume, for an alternative perspective. 
 
4.2 English as described object 
 
I pointed out in 2.3 and 2.4 that in describing languages, linguists abstract away from I-
LANGUAGES and E-LANGUAGE to systems assumed to hold at the level of unified communities of 
users, usually with the ontological status of P-LANGUAGE. I would now like to argue that, after 
the ontological onion skins have been stripped away, linguists’ descriptions of ‘the English 
language’ are manifestations of ENGLISHRY, conditioned by the N-LANGUAGE notion of 
‘Standard English’ and only indirectly reflecting aspects of L-ENGLISH (cf. Milroy, 2001;  
Armstrong and Mackenzie, 2013, ch. 2). Conceptualizations of English within linguistics are 
not themselves instances of N-LANGUAGE, because they involve what are assumed to be the 
constitutive norms of I-ENGLISH or the regularities holding across ENENGLISHMENTS, rather than 
regulative norms imposed on the basis of preconceived notions of correctness. But, as the 
next section shows, linguistic descriptions of English reinforce the ordinary belief that 
unstandardized varieties may not be part of ‘the language’ (Haugen, 1966, p. 924). I will call 
such conceptualizations of English ‘P-ENGLISH’ (cf. Chomsky, 1986, p. 33) when viewed as 
abstractions from ENENGLISHMENTS, and ‘IDEALIZED I-ENGLISH’ when viewed as abstractions from 
I-ENGLISHES. 
 
4.2.1 P-ENGLISH and IDEALIZED I-ENGLISH 
 
A typical P-ENGLISH conceptualization can be found in Huddleston and Pullum’s (2002) The 
Cambridge grammar of the English language, which sets out to describe “the linguistic 
system itself” (p. 2), taken to be “modern Standard English”. Data for the description come 
from the authors’ intuitions and those of native-speaker consultants, corpora, dictionaries, 
and other grammars. There is no claim to psychological reality, but there is an assumption 
that a single system exists, for which constitutive rules are provided. Equally, generativists 
have sought to describe ‘the grammar of English’, and again their accounts are clearly 
filtered through assumptions about grammaticality in a monolithic system, this time as 
IDEALIZED I-ENGLISH. One such account is Haegeman and Guéron’s (1999) English grammar: A 
generative perspective, based on native-speaker grammaticality judgements and using data 
only from “formal English”. The authors’ stated intention is “to formulate part of the 
grammar of English” (p. 17, my emphasis). 
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Another kind of linguistic description conditioned by N-ENGLISH is that based exclusively on 
samples of ENENGLISHMENT data, represented in corpora, typically from thousands of different 
writers and speakers. One well-known example is Biber et al.’s (1999) Grammar of spoken 
and written English, the result of an analysis of over 40 million words drawn from several 
registers (types of ENGLISHING). The authors state that one of their major goals is “to describe 
the patterns of variation that exist within standard English” (p. 18). The “brief survey of non-
standard  features” they refer to (p. 20) takes up four of the 1125 pages of the volume. 
Although differing from traditional and generativist linguistics in terms of methodology and 
evidence, the conceptualization of English appears to be comparable, limited to what is 
taken a priori to be ‘Standard English’, rather than sampling across the much broader range 
of actual ENENGLISHMENTs. Such descriptions represent P-ENGLISH abstractions conditioned by 
N-ENGLISH, and therefore again as instantiations of ENGLISHRY. 
 
4.2.2 L2 Englishes 
 
Across the approaches and practices discussed so far, it is tacitly assumed that English 
‘belongs’ to native speakers alone (cf. Wicaksono, this volume). When construed to include 
those who use English as an L2, most notably in the World Englishes framework, the ‘native 
speaker’ element of N-ENGLISH is discarded. Yet the other elements of N-ENGLISH are 
preserved: Pennycook (2007, p. 107), for example, suggests that ‘the concept of World 
Englishes does little more than pluralise monolithic English’. So-called ‘Outer Circle’ 
Englishes are viewed as named, national systems which follow their own norms, such as 
Indian English, Kenyan English, etc. (cf. Davis, 2006). Many ‘Expanding Circle’ Englishes (e.g. 
China English, Mexican English) are treated similarly. Investigation into English(es) used in 
lingua franca contexts has exposed many of the ‘hidden’ ontological commitments to N-
ENGLISH in mainstream linguistics. But even in English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) studies, there 
is evidence of an underlying P-ENGLISH interpretation of the phenomenon. Initial 
presentations of ELF implied its existence as a variety of English, a “language system” 
(Seidlhofer, 2001, p. 146). And even after moves to reconceptualize it as a kind of ENGLISHING, 
in line with Canagarajah’s (2007) arguments, there is still a tendency to present ELF in ways 
which invite reified P-LANGUAGE conceptualizations (cf. Mortensen, 2013; Harder, this 
volume). Section 5.2 below discusses the practical implications for L2 learning and use of the 
ontological confusion underlying monolithic views of English. 
 
Table 2.2 summarizes the ontological categories of English identified in this section. 
 
ENGLISHRY 
(socially constructed components of English national identity) 
Resource 
Social domain Notional domain 
N-ENGLISH 
(a social construction of L-
ENGLISH): essentially, the 
named, national system of 
regulative norms known as 
‘Standard English’ 
IDEALIZED I-ENGLISH 
(an instantiation of IDEALIZED 
I-LANGUAGE): theorized 
constitutive norms for a 
linguistic system abstracted 
from I-ENGLISHES, but 
P-ENGLISH 
(instantiations of P-
LANGUAGE): theorized 
constitutive norms for a 
linguistic system abstracted 
from ENENGLISHMENTS, and 
sometimes correlated with 
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implicitly conditioned by N-
ENGLISH 
types of ENGLISHING, but 
implicitly conditioned by N-
ENGLISH 
 
Table 2.2: English as linguistic manifestations of ENGLISHRY  
 
5 English as subject 
 
The emergence of English as a manifestation of ENGLISHRY gave rise to, and subsequently has 
been sustained by, a set of subjects studied in educational institutions, also called English 
(the topic of Part C and Chapter 11, this volume). These subjects involve the study of N-
ENGLISH and P-ENGLISH as L1 resources (5.1) and as L2 resources (5.2), and the study of 
literature written using I-ENGLISHES (5.3). Figure 2.2 shows their relationship with the 
ontological types described in sections 3 and 4. In this final section, I suggest that 
educational objectives and practices regarding English might be usefully critiqued by 
applying the framework presented above. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: From L-ENGLISH to English as subject 
 
5.1 English as subject for L1 users 
 
When children acquiring and using English as an L1 are required to study the regularities of 
‘Standard English’ deliberately, as part of a school subject, there is once again an ontological 
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conflict. Educational policy, assuming N-ENGLISH, fails to appreciate that the P-LANGUAGE 
descriptions of ‘Standard English’ taught in schools can be deliberately learned, but not, like 
I-LANGUAGE, naturally acquired. Instruction, as opposed to ENGLISHING experience, will result in 
conscious metalinguistic knowledge of a set of P-ENGLISH facts. In the brain, the unconscious 
I-LANGUAGE resources drawn upon during LANGUAGING are associated with two kinds of 
memory system: declarative and procedural (cf. Ullman, 2014). Declarative systems store 
arbitrary facts, including vocabulary. Procedural systems store automatized (entrenched) 
patterns, including grammatical constructions, which are used effortlessly for fluent 
communication. All consciously learned and deliberately accessed knowledge, however, 
whether lexical or syntactic, is controlled by declarative memory. Knowledge about English 
(e.g. about P-ENGLISH) is stored there. So for most pupils who have limited previous 
experience of ENENGLISHMENTS which accord with N-ENGLISH norms, the English they study at 
school will not become the entrenched procedural I-REGISTER they need for national contexts 
of ENGLISHING. What they learn as declarative knowledge will be deployed deliberately, and 
in many cases only laboriously. Of course, extensive involvement in ENGLISHING in 
appropriate contexts can result in I-REGISTERS which correspond to N-ENGLISH norms, but this 
cannot be guaranteed. And it makes little sense to expect, as England’s current national 
curriculum does, that young children should deliberately study P-ENGLISH descriptions of 
‘Standard English’ before actually acquiring the I-LANGUAGE features corresponding to it 
through ENGLISHING (cf. UKLA and Owen Education, 2016; Goddard, this volume). 
 
5.2 English as subject for L2 learners and users 
 
For L2 English, ontological confusion also stymies effective educational practice. In L2 
English classrooms, the target for learning and the model for teaching are almost always 
‘Standard English’, and accuracy (the extent to which learners’ ENENGLISHMENTS follow P-
ENGLISH rules derived from N-ENGLISH regulative norms) is still the main parameter of 
assessment (although see Harsch and Nakatsuhara et al., both this volume). The desired 
outcome of L2 English study is, however, normally professed to be communicative 
competence, i.e. fluent and effective ENGLISHING, but this requires I-ENGLISH resources in 
procedural memory (Hall, 2014). As a subject, therefore, L2 English is the converse of L1 
English: children in L1 environments first acquire a dispreferred (unstandardized) I-ENGLISH at 
home and are expected to replace it at school with learned N-ENGLISH; L2 learners first learn 
about ‘correct’ N-ENGLISH and are then expected to acquire a usable I-ENGLISH. As with L1, it is 
possible, under the right circumstances (exposure, motivation, etc.), for learners to achieve 
sufficient conscious control of N-ENGLISH facts in declarative memory to be able to deploy 
them effectively in interaction, and perhaps to develop an unconscious I-ENGLISH in 
procedural memory which matches the norms of N-ENGLISH (and many learners may want or 
need this: see Kohn, 2011; Harder, this volume).  But for most L2 learners, the I-ENGLISH they 
develop will inevitably be influenced by their own L1, by the learning processes they engage 
in, and by the uses to which they put their resources. This I-ENGLISH is English, but just like 
most L1 I-ENGLISHES, obeys its own regularities rather than being governed by N-ENGLISH 
norms (cf. Lemhöfer et al. 2014 for neuropsychological evidence supporting this view). It 
thus makes little sense to insist on accuracy in those norms (Page, this volume), unless 
‘Standard English’ ENENGLISHMENTS are required or desired for social conformity, e.g. for study 
in English-medium higher education institutions (Swan, 2017). 
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5.3 English as literature 
 
Finally, the term English is used to refer not to the study of any of the ontological types 
described here, but to the study of literary texts, examples of ENENGLISHMENTS produced 
deliberately as creative/artistic products using I-ENGLISHES. Here the role and status of N-
LANGUAGE is perhaps most palpable, because the ‘canon’ is viewed as a source and model of 
its legitimacy, as observed for example in dictionary citations and good usage guides. I won’t 
say more about this issue here, except to suggest that maybe it’s time to rename the 
subject, in order to avoid the implication that the essence of L-ENGLISH, or of ENGLISHRY, is to 
be found in literary form. English Music or English Art don’t appear on any school curriculum 
I am aware of, so perhaps it’s time for just Literature? See Goodwyn and Roberts (both this 
volume) for extended discussion of English (literature) as a school subject. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
My aim in this chapter has been to highlight the ways in which the fundamental elements of 
human language(s) as instantiations of the LANGUAGE CAPACITY have been reinterpreted 
through the lens of collective identification with NATION, to give rise to the ‘folk ontology’ of 
English as a manifestation of ENGLISHRY. Ordinary uses of the word English reflect deep-
seated beliefs about the nature of language and its relationship with national identity. These 
beliefs have been embedded through the operation of hegemonic cultural forces, acting 
especially through education systems, to maximize “internal cohesion [and] external 
distinction” (Haugen 1966, p. 928). The N-LANGUAGE manifestation of this deliberate 
contemplation and construction of ‘the language of the English’ is the monolithic social 
construct ‘Standard English’. This construct is inevitably accompanied by notions of 
correctness and accuracy (and therefore error and failure) in schooling and society at large. I 
argued in this chapter that it has also influenced linguistic understandings of the notions of 
‘grammaticality’ and ‘non-standardness’, in that ‘the English language’ is typically presented 
in terms of P-LANGUAGE (or IDEALIZED I-LANGUAGE) descriptions of the ‘standard variety’. It is, 
then, unsurprising that for many teachers of English, both as L1 and L2, the subject they 
teach is understood in terms of P-ENGLISH, and this is what learners expect. The fact that 
learners can and will only acquire I-ENGLISHES, and that only I-ENGLISHES can be used 
effortlessly and effectively in ENGLISHING, is mostly unappreciated. 
 
Readers may not be persuaded by my interpretation of how the ontological categories and 
types I propose underpin beliefs and practices in English teaching and assessment. But the 
framework should at least provide some points of reference for examining their own 
ontological commitments regarding English and, particularly, for teasing apart the following: 
 
• effective use of linguistic resources for social practices (I- ENGLISHES in ENGLISHING) vs. 
performance of ‘proper’ Anglophone identities (conformity with N-ENGLISH norms); 
• actual language functions and usage (ENGLISHING and ENENGLISHMENTS) vs. knowledge 
of idealized language descriptions (P-ENGLISH and IDEALIZED I-ENGLISH); 
• acquirable cognitive resources (I-ENGLISHES) vs. learnable metalinguistic knowledge 
(P-ENGLISH, N-ENGLISH); 
• communicative potential and creativity (entrenched I-ENGLISHES and fluent ENGLISHING) 
vs. social conformity (N-ENGLISH accuracy in ENENGLISHMENTS); 
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• what is out there (I-ENGLISH and ENGLISHING) vs. what one feels should be out there (N-
ENGLISH). 
 
I hope that the detailed anatomy of the senses of English provided above will help with this 
ongoing critical process. 
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